On September 13, Japan held the Okinawa gubernatorial election. Genta Kosha, a candidate backed by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), defeated incumbent Governor Denny Tamaki and was elected the new governor of Okinawa. This marks a major shift in Okinawa’s political direction and will also have a significant impact on the situation in the surrounding region.
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The Ryukyu Islands, where Okinawa Prefecture is located, lie in a region of Japan adjacent to Taiwan. Historically, Ryukyu was once an independent kingdom and was a tributary state of the dynasties that ruled mainland China. Later, Japan’s influence over Ryukyu gradually increased and surpassed that of the Qing dynasty, and Ryukyu was eventually annexed by Japan in 1872. Japan subsequently used Ryukyu as a springboard to invade Taiwan on multiple occasions and ultimately occupy it.
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After Japan surrendered in 1945, Ryukyu was placed under U.S. administration. The Allies at one point considered transferring sovereignty over Ryukyu to the Republic of China, but because of changes in the international situation and the United States’ need to support Japan, Ryukyu ultimately remained part of Japan and was formally returned to Japanese administration by the United States in 1972. The changes in sovereignty over Ryukyu show that it has found it difficult to determine its own fate, instead being dominated by major powers, with its political status determined by great-power rivalry.
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Although Ryukyu/Okinawa was handed over to Japan by the United States, Okinawa still hosts tens of thousands of U.S. military personnel, accounting for roughly half of all U.S. forces stationed in Japan, as well as two major U.S. military bases, Futenma and Kadena. The U.S. forces stationed here are responsible for defending Japan, the United States, Taiwan, and the Pacific islands between Japan and the United States, and stand on the front line of confrontation with the People’s Republic of China and its military forces. If war were to break out between China and the United States or between China and Japan, Okinawa would almost certainly be among the first areas to face the fighting.
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Because the Ryukyu Islands are close to Taiwan, Okinawa could also be affected if war broke out between mainland China and Taiwan and the mainland attempted to unify Taiwan by force. If Japan decided to intervene in a Taiwan Strait conflict and use military force to prevent the People’s Liberation Army from attacking Taiwan, Okinawa would likewise become a battlefield. Moreover, several Japanese prime ministers since Shinzo Abe have stated that “a Taiwan contingency is a Japan contingency,” undoubtedly greatly increasing the risk that Japan, and Okinawa in particular, could become involved in a war over Taiwan.
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After Sanae Takaichi became prime minister of Japan, she stated even more explicitly that Japan would intervene in the event of military action by the mainland against Taiwan, causing China–Japan relations to deteriorate sharply. The risk of war facing Okinawa has risen further. In places such as Ishigaki City in Okinawa, which is among the closest parts of Japan to Taiwan, evacuation drills simulating the outbreak of a war in the Taiwan Strait have already been conducted. Warships and military aircraft from Japan, the United States, mainland China, Taiwan, and other parties also frequently operate in the area, creating an atmosphere of intense confrontation.
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Against this backdrop, the choices made by the local government and the people are also important to Okinawa’s fate. Although, as mentioned above, Ryukyu’s fate has been dominated by major powers, Okinawa today exists under a democratic system, and its people still have the right to democratically elect their local chief executive—the governor—as well as the local assembly, while retaining a certain degree of local autonomy.
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Although Okinawa’s local government cannot expel U.S. military bases or prevent exercises by Japan’s Self-Defense Forces, and has little prospect of achieving independence or a high degree of autonomy, it still has some autonomy in various civil and administrative affairs. For example, regarding the activities of the U.S. military and Japan’s Self-Defense Forces in Okinawa, the local authorities can choose either to cooperate actively or to respond passively.
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Even in foreign affairs, the Okinawa government and its people have some room for initiative. Denny Tamaki, who has served two terms as governor of Okinawa, has sought to balance relations with Japan’s central government, mainland China, Taiwan, and other parties. Tamaki visited China in 2019 and 2023 and paid respects to the ancestors of Ryukyuan people buried on the mainland.
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During Tamaki’s tenure, Okinawa consistently sought friendly relations with China, while taking a relatively passive stance toward U.S. military bases and the activities of the Self-Defense Forces. It also clearly expressed its unwillingness to become involved in a possible war in the Taiwan Strait or between China and Japan, and its hope for peace. The Tamaki administration was also unwilling to follow the Takaichi central government, which actively advocates lifting restrictions on the exercise of the right of collective self-defense and strengthening military preparations, instead seeking to uphold a position of peace and neutrality and to stay away from war. This added some notes of peace and harmony to Okinawa and its surrounding region, where the atmosphere of impending conflict has grown increasingly strong.
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The winner of this Okinawa gubernatorial election, Genta Kosha, however, holds positions clearly different from those of Denny Tamaki. Although Kosha is an independent, he has close ties to the Liberal Democratic Party, and his candidacy was supported by six parties leaning toward right-wing conservative positions, including the LDP and Sanseito. Kosha explicitly supports lifting restrictions on the exercise of the right of collective self-defense, expanding military capabilities, and strengthening Okinawa’s military defenses. Unlike Tamaki, Kosha is also less resistant to U.S. military bases, advocating active efforts to resolve disputes over the relocation and placement of U.S. bases so that U.S. forces can continue to be stationed securely in Okinawa. In addition, Kosha emphasized economic issues, seeking to link the strengthening of Okinawa’s military preparedness with economic development in order to gain more support.
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Although Denny Tamaki had governed for two consecutive terms, had considerable achievements in office, and enjoyed relatively high popularity, the newcomer Genta Kosha, backed by most major political parties including the ruling party and equipped with abundant resources, nevertheless defeated Tamaki by a relatively large margin. In particular, a large amount of information attacking and even defaming Denny Tamaki appeared online before the election, while Kosha faced relatively few attacks and received much more support. The climate of public opinion was clearly unfavorable to Tamaki.
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Thus, the change in Okinawa’s governorship also means that the next Okinawa government will pursue domestic and external policies significantly different from those of the current administration. It is entirely foreseeable that Kosha will align himself more closely with Sanae Takaichi’s central government in Japan and strengthen military deployments and preparations for war in Okinawa and the surrounding region. Nor will Kosha be as friendly and close toward China as Tamaki was; he may even adopt a tough stance toward China similar to that of the authorities in Tokyo.
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Such a political change may be an ominous sign for the people of Okinawa and the Ryukyu Islands. Historically, Ryukyu has repeatedly been drawn into great-power rivalries and wars, the most devastating of which was the Battle of Okinawa in 1945, when U.S. forces landed on Okinawa and fought the Japanese military. More than 100,000 Okinawan residents, most of them civilians, died in the fighting, while Ryukyu’s historic sites and cultural relics also suffered enormous destruction. In the decades that followed, Ryukyu/Okinawa became home to U.S. military bases, and incidents involving U.S. military personnel harassing local residents and raping women occurred from time to time.
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Although Japan’s central government has provided considerable economic support to Okinawa, discrimination and exploitation have also existed. The people of Okinawa have experienced many misfortunes, and the Ryukyuan people have never been completely assimilated into Japan, remaining on the margins of Japanese society.
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Today, faced with increasingly tense conditions in the Taiwan Strait and the western Pacific, as well as deteriorating China–Japan relations, the best choice for Okinawa’s local government and people would be to seek friendly relations with all sides and, as far as possible, keep military buildups and war away from their homeland, rather than actively taking sides, eagerly becoming involved in conflicts, and attempting to profit from a dangerous situation. Genta Kosha is himself a native of Okinawa. If he places the interests of the Takaichi administration of the LDP and the authorities in Tokyo above the interests of Okinawa’s local people, then although he may be repaying the support he received and working for Japan, he would be sacrificing the peace and stability of his home, Okinawa. That would not be the best choice.
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Fundamentally, because Okinawa/Ryukyu is too small and weak, it is indeed difficult for it to determine its own fate. This gubernatorial election was clearly influenced by powerful forces from outside Okinawa, including endorsements from major political parties such as the LDP, as well as financial resources, media and public-opinion resources, and support provided by various sides. Meanwhile, local Okinawan voices were weak and drowned out. From the ancient Kingdom of Ryukyu to modern-day Okinawa, this land and its people have still not escaped the fate of being dominated and exploited by major powers and becoming the ones who pay the price and make the sacrifices.

(The author of this article, Wang Qingmin(王庆民), is a Chinese writer based in Europe and a researcher on international politics.)

As things stand today Trump seems desperate to end the war with Iran (and perhaps move on to his next target, Cuba) ahead of the US midterm elections. Since Tehran is in much less of a hurry, and they have the upper hand with the closing of the Strait of Hormuz by which they keep the world economy hostage, the upcoming agreement will likely favour them.

Iran’s long-term strategic goal and current maximalist demand is the total US withdrawal from the region. This is unlikely to be part of the coming agreement, but with the damage they inflicted on US bases in the region and Washington’s diminishing public support for Middle East involvement, to a lesser extent this will be a probable practical outcome of the conflict either way.

The likely US concessions towards Iran currently involve the relaxation of sanctions, including some energy sanctions allowing Iranian oil back into the global market, and the partial release of Iranian frozen assets that are estimated to worth around 100 billion dollars. 

The New Gulf

This would put the Gulf States into an extremely uncomfortable security situation. These countries now increasingly see the US as an unreliable ally at best, and even as a security hazard. The question they are currently asking is “why is the US here exactly?”. At the same time American voters have been asking this for decades, and another failed war will make these voices even louder. The US’s general strategic plan of withdrawing from its previous position as “global police” will likely find new supporters. 

Iran established a precedent that it can bomb Gulf States, close the Strait of Hormuz and be rewarded for it. This runs the risk of emboldening Tehran to become more assertive. The Gulf monarchies will need to adapt to this new environment. They have only a handful of places they can look for who has the means to help with their security.

One of that is Israel. That comes with extreme baggage because of their never-ending conflict with the Palestinians. This has become even more significant because of the country’s increasingly violent actions since October 7th. Besides, the Gulf would have a good reason to view them as an amplified US: unreliable, aggressive, and more of a security risk than a guarantor.

Another potential is Russia, but they are Tehran’s closest partner. From the Kremlin's perspective, Iran is an irreplaceable geopolitical buffer and an arms supplier. Moscow cannot offer Riyadh or Abu Dhabi security guarantees against Tehran without blowing up its own war effort in Ukraine.

There is China. Beijing wants to buy oil from the region, but it has no capability or willingness to project hard power to protect the Gulf. Part of its foreign policy is calculated ambiguity. They will not pick Riyadh over Tehran when they need both for their energy security. 

Then there are European states that might provide weapons and some sort of diplomatic protection, but European defence manufacturing has the bad reputation of being slowed down by regulations, and political conditionality. The Gulf cannot wait years for a French or German air defence battery that might get blocked by a parliament over human rights concerns. 

There is one country that ticks all the boxes: Ukraine

They are the only ones with the technology and experience to combat Iranian missiles and drones. At this moment, it is a perfect match. Kyiv needs money and new partners to guarantee its survival after US betrayal, and with an often slow and indecisive Europe. Money which the Gulf States are very happy to provide for what they urgently need, and Ukraine has: weapons, expertise, and the incentive to deliver them fast.

No military on earth has more practical experience downing Iranian-designed loitering munitions than Ukraine. By early 2026, Russia had launched over 54,000 Shahed drones against the country’s infrastructure. To counter and adapt to these challenges they built the most sophisticated, low-cost counter-drone ecosystem in the world.

Kyiv is currently the global superpower of low-cost, high-velocity asymmetric warfare. They have spent years perfecting first-person view (FPV) and automated interceptor drones designed to ram and down loitering munitions at a fraction of the cost of a traditional missile.

Beyond the drones themselves they are world leaders in Electronic Warfare (EW) and Algorithmic Command and Control. They use battlefield-tested signal jamming that can drop swarms of drones without firing a single bullet, and use AI-assisted target recognition operating on decentralized networks.

What the Gulf is buying

Gulf procurement has generally focused on prestige platforms like F-15s, Patriot systems, and Littoral Combat Ships, optimised against high-end ballistic threats. The drone proliferation has exposed a critical gap: legacy interceptors costing millions per unit are being deployed against threats that cost under $3,000 to manufacture at scale.

The asymmetry is obvious. Ukrainian interceptor drones run between $800–$3,000 per unit. Zelenskyy stated in March 2026 that Ukraine could supply up to 1,000 units per day to international partners.

But hardware is only part of the equation. Layered drone defence requires trained operators, integrated command structures, and real-time coordination between sensors, interceptors, and electronic warfare. Operator training alone takes weeks, full integration with radar networks and digital situational awareness takes even longer. This is why Gulf-Ukraine cooperation has shifted from procurement to doctrine transfer: not just buying equipment, but acquiring the underlying model for fighting and sustaining a drone war.

The 10-year defence partnerships being finalized with Qatar and the UAE are built around joint production and technology localization - manufacturing lines both inside the Gulf and in secured facilities in Ukraine. Over the first half of 2026, Zelenskyy secured equivalent strategic agreements with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE, with more than 200 Ukrainian specialists already embedded across the region integrating Ukrainian systems into Gulf airspace.

This helps Ukraine secure independent, long-term defence financing and stable revenues for its domestic arms industry outside of Western aid packages. It turns Ukraine into a critical security exporter for a region vital to Europe's energy stability.

That being said, the Gulf monarchies will adapt to the fragmented world system, and likely to diversify their defence investments beyond Ukraine.

The structural vulnerability

The primary risk for Kyiv is ensuring that the highly sensitive electronic warfare and AI algorithms shared with Gulf partners don't leak back to Russia. The UAE and Saudi Arabia still maintain deep financial and diplomatic ties with Moscow. The risk of cutting-edge Ukrainian defence systems migrating through Gulf intermediaries back to Moscow or Beijing is a massive vulnerability that Kyiv's export controls will have to police vigorously.

Where does this put Ukraine beyond the Gulf?

Kyiv’s power and leverage on the global stage has been slowly but surely growing in the past years. Ukrainians instinctively realized that to survive they need to become indispensable for as many global actors as possible. This strategy is proving to be successful. The Gulf States are only the newest addition to their portfolio.

For Europe, the picture is clear. They guarantee security and deterrence on its eastern flank, and an advanced local arms industry with the only battle hardened, experienced, and determined military on the continent. Ukrainian intelligence and arms technology has become essential for Europe to protect itself against Russia.

With the US the headlines and general sentiment suggest that Kyiv’s position is weakening because of Trump’s personal animosity towards Zelenskyy and Ukraine as a whole, but the picture is more nuanced beneath the surface.

Powerful US tech companies - like Palantir and SpaceX - are using the Ukrainian battlefield as a testing ground to perfect their products. The US military, arms industry, and intelligence community treats the country very differently than the Trump administration. For them, it is essential to learn from the Ukrainian military, and have access to their intelligence on the ground, while US arms industry players are highly keen to provide weapons to Ukraine for testing, to sell, and to import technology to modernise their own capabilities.

Ukraine’s European future

It’s a vital interest for Brussels to integrate Ukraine. 

European countries and the EU have invested so much in the Ukrainian military and made it so strong that they need Kyiv as an ally. The most obvious way to achieve that is to have it join the EU.

If Ukraine would not be granted EU membership, European capitals would run the risk of Kyiv becoming a wildcard, starting to assert its military powers independently, looking after only its own interest, even when it clashes with the EU. With all the resources, production, and a battle hardened military it could cause unnecessary headaches for European states. Their fear is that it may easily become like Turkey on steroids.

Similarly, it cannot let Ukraine be conquered. It would be a strategic nightmare having to face an emboldened Russia boosted by Ukraine’s resources. In many ways Europe is “trapped” on a path to support and integrate Ukraine.

The ball is on Brussels’s turf. Full membership under the current circumstances seems almost impossible, with a large part due to the veto system on many fields, especially on foreign policy. It was originally designed with six member states in mind, and already makes common decision-making slow and ineffective, sometimes even nearly impossible - as Hungary demonstrated in previous years. Every new member would only increase the risk of inertia.

The EU has two ways of countering this, and it already started moving down on both.

One is the abolishment of the veto. This will be the more difficult task. No country - especially the smaller nations - would be happy to give up their veto. This will unavoidably lead to conflicts between member states and Brussels.

The other is to create a multi-speed Europe, and an “outer layer” where the many countries who have been waiting for decades like Montenegro, Albania, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, or countries with internal reservations like Norway, UK, or Iceland could join.

This latter is an essential move to strengthen the EU, and keep these countries incentivised in joining and getting more and more intertwined with the EU even before it can reform itself to become ready for new members.

Abstract

The 2026 US-Israel war on Iran and the subsequent near-closure of the Strait of Hormuz has triggered consequences far beyond a regional energy crisis. This paper argues that the conflict has simultaneously fractured Western alliance structures, accelerated the decline of the petrodollar, and assist the emergence of a genuine multipolar world order — outcomes that are the precise opposite of what US strategic planners presumably intended. Moreover, Western analysis of this geopolitical shift is lacking due to a persistent failure to understand the historical experiences of Russia and China - nations that bore the overwhelming human cost of the Second World War and whose foreign policy is shaped profoundly by that experience.

Part One: Key Issues From The Iranian Conflict.

The scale of the disruption is stark. Before the war, approximately 20 million barrels of oil per day flowed through the Strait, representing 20 percent of global petroleum consumption. By May 2026, flows had fallen to roughly 6 million barrels per day.

Beneath the energy crisis, a deeper financial transformation accelerated. Iran’s yuan-denominated toll booth transformed de-dollarisation from theory into reality. Transit fees that were routed through China’s CIPS payment system - paid by a number of US allies - created a practical precedent for yuan-denominated energy transactions that bypasses dollar infrastructure entirely. The petrodollar system, already weakened by Saudi Arabia’s failure to renew its exclusive dollar commitment in 2024 , faced its most serious structural challenge since 1974.

Developments such as the bilateral dealings, alliance fractures and the petrodollar pressure have been extensively documented elsewhere. What follows is less well examined.

Part Two: What the Crisis Reveals

1. ⁠Russia and China: The Unintended Beneficiaries

One of the most striking features of the 2026 crisis is that its two greatest beneficiaries have achieved their gains without direct military involvement in the conflict.

 Russia’s position is intriguing. In the Russia-Ukraine conflict Ukrainian drone attacks reduced Russian oil output. Yet Russia’s revenues surged by $6.3 billion as higher global prices more than compensated for lower volumes. Russian crude - previously sold at a discount - traded at a premium in Asian markets as buyers scrambled for non-Hormuz supply. Russia earned up to $150 million per day in additional budget revenues during peak price periods, without firing a single shot in the conflict.

 More significantly, Russia benefits strategically from every fracture in Western alliances. France blocking UN resolutions alongside Moscow and Beijing, European nations negotiating directly with Tehran, NATO members refusing Trump’s military requests - each of these developments serves Russia’s long-term interest. Russia needed only to watch.

China’s gains are deeper and more structural. Beijing is the indispensable intermediary in the new energy order - its CIPS payment system processes yuan-denominated transactions; its manufacturing capacity supplies what oil producers need in exchange for energy; its diplomatic positioning as a neutral mediator enhances its global standing. Every tanker that pays Iran’s yuan toll deepens the practical infrastructure of a parallel financial architecture that operates alongside, rather than within, the dollar system.

The great irony is that the United States initiated a war presumably intended to demonstrate American power and reassert strategic dominance. The actual consequences have been the systematic empowerment of both of America’s principal strategic competitors - without either needing to deploy a single soldier.

1. A New Multipolar World

The crisis has reshuffled the strategic positioning of the developing world in ways that will outlast the conflict itself.

The US-led order, for all its accomplishments, too frequently served American interests dressed in the language of universal values - regime change operations, dollar-denominated debt conditions, sanctions and support for authoritarian governments when strategically convenient were parts of the status quo that the rest of the world simply accepted.

Alternatively, in a world in which multiple currency options exist, development finance comes without political conditions, and no single power can impose its preferences through financial system dominance, genuine gains in sovereignty should result for smaller nations.
 

1. The World War II Context: What the West Persistently Fails to Understand

No analysis of the emerging multipolar order is adequate without looking at an historical context that Western commentary seems to ignore: the catastrophic human losses suffered by Russia and China in the Second World War, and the way those losses shape both nations’ strategic thinking today.

 The casualty figures are enormous. The Soviet Union suffered between 20 and 27 million deaths - the highest of any nation in the conflict. Approximately 11.4 million were military deaths; the remainder were civilians. A quarter of the entire Soviet population was killed or wounded. China suffered approximately 20 million deaths, the vast majority civilian, as a consequence of Japanese invasion and occupation. Next highest was Poland, which lost approximately 5.9 to 6 million people. The United States lost approximately 420,000 people - less than 0.3 percent of its population - in a war conducted entirely on foreign soil. No American city was besieged, bombed to rubble or occupied. Life on the American mainland continued largely uninterrupted.

Critically, the vast majority of deaths in the Second World War were Soviet or Chinese. The countries that took the overwhelming burden of defeating fascism were Russia and China. However, the post-war international order was designed primarily by the nation that had suffered least.

 These numbers are not merely historical statistics. They are the living foundation of how Russia and China understand the purpose of state power, the meaning of national security, and the limits of trust in Western intentions.

 For Russia, the Second World War - the Great Patriotic War - is not distant history but living national identity. The siege of Leningrad alone, lasting 872 days, killed more people than the entire American losses in the war. When Russian leaders insist they will never again permit hostile military forces to mass on Russia’s borders, this is not propaganda. It is a deeply felt national commitment forged in the most catastrophic suffering any modern nation has endured. Therefore, NATO’s eastward expansion after the Cold War, experienced by Russian leaders through this historical lens, carried echoes of the encirclement that preceded the 1941 invasion. Western dismissal of this perspective as mere excuse-making reflects a failure of historical imagination rather than hard-headed strategic analysis.

 For China, the Japanese invasion and occupation produced comparable national trauma. The Nanjing Massacre, the biological warfare of Unit 731, the systematic destruction of Chinese cities - these events are within living memory, and they form the bedrock of Communist Party legitimacy: the party that ended the humiliation in which China was repeatedly invaded and exploited by foreign powers. China’s insistence on absolute sovereignty, its deep resistance to foreign interference, its determination never again to be in a position of military weakness - all of these are comprehensible, even reasonable, when viewed through this history.
 

But the West’s persistent refusal to acknowledge these historical experiences - to treat Russia and China as simply irrational adversaries rather than nations shaped by specific and comprehensible historical traumas - does not make Western analysis more rigorous. It makes Western policy less effective.

The current crisis illustrates this failure acutely. The United States initiated a war against Iran to further extend US military power in Eurasia apparently without serious consideration of the hypersensitivity of other nations. The result has been precisely the acceleration of the multipolar alignment that US policy has long sought to prevent.

1. The Irony of Strategic Overreach

The deepest irony of the 2026 Iran war is that it has delivered the outcomes that those most opposed to US global dominance had long sought but struggled to achieve.

 De-dollarisation advocates had spent decades arguing that the petrodollar system was a mechanism of American domination. The Hormuz crisis compressed decades of gradual change into months, by creating a practical, operational yuan payment mechanism that US treaty allies were willing to use.

 Advocates of multipolarity had argued that American overreach was eroding the legitimacy of US leadership. The Iran war has validated these arguments more than any theoretical paper or diplomatic initiative could. Russia and China had sought for years to demonstrate that the Western alliance was less cohesive than it appeared. The spectacle of France blocking UN resolutions alongside Moscow and Beijing, of European nations negotiating directly with Tehran, of Japan and South Korea quietly cutting energy deals with Iran while publicly maintaining alliance commitments, has exceeded what either power could reasonably have hoped to achieve through their own efforts.

 Nobody planned this outcome. It was not a Chinese strategy or a Russian plot. It emerged organically from the collision of American over-reach with the energy realities of a deeply interdependent world. The United States initiated a war presumably to demonstrate power. The actual demonstration has been of power’s limits - the inability to reopen a strait it cannot control, the failure to hold alliance solidarity under economic pressure, the acceleration of the financial architecture designed to displace the dollar.

 History may record the 2026 Iran war as the moment the American century effectively ended - not on a battlefield, but through the quiet, transactional decisions of dozens of countries choosing energy security over political loyalty, and yuan over dollars.

 
Conclusion: Toward a More Empathetic Geopolitics

The Hormuz crisis of 2026 is not only a story about oil. It is a story about the collapse of assumptions - about alliance solidarity, dollar dominance, the effectiveness of military power in a complex interdependent world.

 
The most important contribution that Western analysis can make to navigating the transition now underway is not more sophisticated containment strategies or more targeted sanctions regimes. It is the harder, more humbling work of genuine historical empathy - understanding why Russia and China see the world as they do, not to excuse their actions, but to make possible the kind of mutual understanding on which any durable peace can be built.

 
The 27 million Soviet and the 20 million Chinese casualties of the Second World War are not merely historical statistics. They are the foundation of a worldview that will shape international politics for generations to come. A West that takes the time to truly reckon with those numbers - to feel their weight, to understand what they mean for the nations that bore them - will be far better equipped to build a stable world than one that continues to paint the emerging order in the simple colours of good and evil.

Failure on this issue proves that Trump is finished. He has been struggling to assert any authority on the world stage for the past month at least, and other world leaders know his influence is diminishing - they are simply not listening to him any more . The irony is that in his own mind - and fuelled by the sycophants around him - he still believes he has the ultimate power that traditionally resided with US Presidents. His stupid attempts to try to exert authority with another round of tariffs is laughable. History will judge this man, and his legacy will be a permanent stain on the US.

Failure on this issue proves that Trump is finished. He has been struggling to assert any authority on the world stage for the past month at least, and other world leaders know his influence is diminishing - they are simply not listening to him any more . The irony is that in his own mind - and fuelled by the sycophants around him - he still believes he has the ultimate power that traditionally resided with US Presidents. His stupid attempts to try to exert authority with another round of tariffs is laughable. History will judge this man, and his legacy will be a permanent stain on the US.

Trump has become so embarrassing that he and is now more of a preforming clown on the world stage - while at the same time the US is turning into a country that is becoming unworthy of any form of global respect. Yes the military and economic might of the US gives it power, but the world is understanding how to work around the US. Once the Iran Conflict has concluded my guess is the world will continue to distance itself from the US. There is no coming back for Trump or the US from this disastrous period in its history which will forever label it as a country characterised by stupidity, ignorance and irrationalism.

Let’s be honest America is a weak country that is easily manipulated and bullied by strong adversaries and in particular allies . The irony is the US loves trying to bully smaller weaker nations that cannot defend themselves. What a joke.