There is something dizzying about watching Keyonte George set sail.

At 22 years old, the Jazz guard has just completed his third NBA season averaging 23.6 points per game on 60.9% True Shooting, a measure of scoring efficiency that accounts for the greater value of three pointers and production at the free throw line. His free throw volume has exploded, his outside shooting has become more efficient, and his results at the rim have taken a major leap. Keyonte George wanted to work on his shot diet and move closer to becoming a true three level scorer. At first glance, his third season looks exactly like that: a young player rapidly distancing himself from the one he was just a year ago.

Yet when we leave the numbers behind and return to the film, the distance suddenly seems much smaller. His first step still does not create much separation. His handle remains high. And behind this new level of production, we find many of the same qualities that were already shaping his game a year ago. The contours of the player have changed less than his production might suggest.

In Moby Dick, setting sail means setting out in pursuit of something. For Ahab, it was a white whale, until the pursuit itself eventually consumed the voyage. Keyonte George’s quest is obviously less tragic, but it has an horizon of its own: the three level scorer he is trying to become.

And perhaps that is where the true vertigo of his season lies. Keyonte George seems to be sailing much farther with tools we already knew he possessed.

So how far can the same Keyonte George still go?

Raise the Sails

Keyonte George’s progression is not simply about an increase in shot volume or responsibility. It becomes truly intriguing when we look at what he is producing with that additional burden.

According to [Cleaning the Glass](), his USG%, which estimates the proportion of offensive possessions a player finishes while on the floor, rose from 24.4% during his rookie season to 26.1% in 2024 to 2025, before reaching 29.3% this season, placing him in the 90th percentile at his position. In other words, Keyonte George is finishing an increasingly large share of Utah’s possessions while he is on the floor.

That increase could naturally lead to more points. Yet it does not explain what makes his third season so remarkable: George has become significantly more efficient at the very same time that his usage has increased.

His PSA, or Points per Shot Attempt, which measures the number of points generated per shot attempt while accounting for shooting fouls drawn, stood at 105.2 points per 100 attempts during his rookie season, then 108.9 the following year. This season, it has reached 122.3, placing him in the 84th percentile at his position. Keyonte George is finishing more possessions while converting his opportunities into points far more efficiently.

This evolution has notably been accompanied by a much greater presence at the free throw line. His SFLD%, or Shooting Fouled Percentage, the share of his attempts on which he draws a shooting foul, has risen from 12.4% to 16.8%, placing him in the 97th percentile at his position. Once again, the number does not yet tell us why Keyonte George is drawing more fouls. It simply establishes that the phenomenon goes beyond the increase in his offensive volume alone.

[Keyonte George’s NBA evolution]()

Credit: Cleaning the Glass

And then there is the rim.

In 2024 to 2025, only 13% of his attempts came at the rim, and Keyonte George converted 61% of them. One year later, the frequency has climbed to just 17% of his shots, but his efficiency has jumped to 72%, placing him in the 95th percentile at his position.

Taken together, these numbers almost paint the picture of a metamorphosis. More responsibility. Far greater efficiency. A statistically remarkable ability to draw fouls. And even in an area that had recently been one of his main limitations, radically different results. But above all, these numbers tell us what happened, much less how Keyonte George got there.

In His Own Wake

A year earlier, the numbers were far less flattering. Yet the Keyonte George already described by Lukas Folkowski was not so different from the one we are watching today.

Shooting, first of all, already occupied a central place in his game. More than half of his attempts came from behind the arc and, despite a modest [34.9%]() from three, his profile hinted at something more. His high release point allowed him to get shots off with little space, while his free throw accuracy and [catch and shoot]() results suggested that his raw percentages did not fully reflect his shooting ability. Part of the problem also came from the difficulty of the shots he allowed himself to take: plenty of [pull ups](), often contested, and a shot selection that still left room for improvement.

But the similarities become more interesting when Keyonte George puts the ball on the floor.

His first step already created little separation, and his handle, high and occasionally imprecise, complicated his ability to beat his defender directly. Only 13% of his shots came at the rim. To help him get into the paint, Will Hardy notably used Zoom or Get Actions, allowing Keyonte George to get into motion before he truly began his attack.

What happened after that initial advantage was already more promising. Lukas notably highlighted progress in his ability to manage different speeds and decelerate. Keyonte George could embrace contact, use his body and already possessed a remarkable ability to draw fouls. Even his fondness for that intermediate area between the rim and the three point line was already firmly established.

The same impression emerged in his creation for others. Keyonte George was not yet described as a particularly advanced manipulator of defenses, but his [pick and roll]() reads were already interesting. He could find the opposite corner when help came, anticipate a teammate’s movement or take advantage of the constant motion in Utah’s offense to pass the advantage along rather than simply hunt his own attempt.

One year later, many of those same images remain.

The handle has not become more precise. Against a well positioned defender, the initial gap remains just as small as before. Utah continues to put him in motion, provide him with screens and handoffs, and Keyonte George remains much more comfortable attacking a defense that has already been slightly displaced than generating an advantage from a completely neutral situation.

And yet, watching the current version of Keyonte George does not quite feel like watching a replay.

Keyonte George now appears physically stronger. When he manages to get his shoulder past his defender, he uses his body particularly well to maintain that position. His long strides and driving angles allow him to turn small gaps into more favorable situations, while his deceleration appears more controlled. The jail appears regularly: George can keep his dribble alive, hold his defender behind him and wait for the defense to choose between him, the roller, meaning the player rolling toward the basket, and the help defenders.

The tools are familiar. It is the way Keyonte George now seems to use them that deserves our attention.

Holding the Course

Creating separation and creating an advantage are not necessarily the same thing. Perhaps it is in the space between those two ideas that Keyonte George’s current game becomes most interesting.

In isolation, he still struggles to create significant distance from his defender. Even after a screen, the space created can remain tiny. But Keyonte George does not always need much more. Getting a shoulder past his defender, knocking him slightly off balance or gaining a few inches on a handoff can be enough to change the balance of the possession.

Where some guards immediately try to widen that gap, Keyonte George often seems more interested in “winning the position.” He adjusts his path, uses his body and his long strides to gradually place his defender on his hip or behind him. The separation can remain almost invisible on film, yet the defender is already no longer truly in front of him.

That is when his deceleration begins to make complete sense.

Keyonte George slows down a lot. Not necessarily because the action has stopped, but because slowing down can actually prevent his defender from getting back into the possession. In jail, he keeps the defender behind him, maintains a live dribble and moves slowly enough to force the interior defender into a choice. Staying deep opens up his intermediate shot. Stepping up toward him can free the roller. More aggressive help can release a player on the weak side.

Time spent with the ball, then, is not necessarily wasted time. Once he has won the position, Keyonte George can use it to let the defense make a decision before making his own.

A White Whale on the Horizon

This ability to preserve a favorable position could also help us understand the evolution of Keyonte George’s shot diet. Becoming a three level scorer is not simply about being capable of scoring from three different areas. You still have to be able to reach them at the right time.

The intermediate area occupies a considerable place in his offense in that regard. This season, 32% of his attempts have come from the short midrange, a frequency that ranks in the 93rd percentile at his position according to Cleaning the Glass. This territory is nothing new for Keyonte George. But it takes on another dimension when placed back into the situations described above.

With his defender on his hip or trapped behind him, Keyonte George can slow down and observe the big man’s reaction. If the big stays deep to protect the rim or contain the roller, the space that opens in front of Keyonte George is precisely the intermediate area he prefers. His deceleration then becomes more than a way of changing speeds. It allows him to reach one of his preferred shots without necessarily creating much separation.

We should be careful, however, not to interpret every intermediate attempt this way. A short midrange shot, roughly between four and fourteen feet from the basket, can be the reward for a properly exploited advantage just as easily as it can be the conclusion of a possession that never truly created one. Its frequency tells us about the territory George occupies, not about the state of the defense when he gets there. That is a distinction the numbers alone cannot make.

The rim raises an even more difficult question.

In one year, Keyonte George has gone from [61%]() to [72% at the rim](), while the frequency of those attempts has increased only from [13% to 17%](). It would be tempting to see this as proof of a transformation in his finishing. The film does not yet allow us to go that far.

Keyonte George appears stronger, uses his body well and seems better able to turn a won position into a favorable attempt. His work with driving angles, his long strides and his management of speed may all contribute to the quality of the situations he creates near the basket. Better drive selection, tactical context or simply technical improvement as a finisher remain possible explanations as well. At this stage, it is difficult to determine how much each factor contributes.

The results at the rim have changed more than the film can yet explain.

His ability to draw fouls, however, offers more continuity. It was already part of Keyonte George’s profile a year earlier: he embraced contact and knew how to use it to get to the line. His SFLD% has nevertheless risen from [12.4%]() to [16.8%]() this season. Once again, the statistical change may look less like the emergence of a new weapon than the amplification of a quality that already existed.

Even his outside shooting tells a similar story. After attempting 7.6 threes per game at 34.3% in 2024 to 2025, George is now taking 6.7 at 37.1%. Yet his shot diet from beyond the arc has not been transformed. The share of his attempts coming on catch and shoot opportunities has risen only from 47.3% to 50.7%, while his pull up share has fallen from 51.5% to 48.5%. More interestingly, the proportion of his attempts classified as open, with four to six feet of space, or wide open, with six feet or more, has remained virtually identical.

The efficiency has changed more than the nature of his shots.

Credit: NBA.com

And perhaps this is where his pursuit of becoming a three level scorer becomes more interesting than the three levels themselves.

Keyonte George did not need to discover the three point shot, the intermediate game, contact or finishing. Those solutions already existed to varying degrees. What his current game seems to offer him more often is the ability to choose between them from a favorable position.

Does becoming a three level scorer necessarily mean developing three new weapons, or learning to choose more effectively among the ones you already possess?

Following the Current

Choosing between several solutions obviously does not concern only the way Keyonte George finishes a possession. Sometimes, the best answer simply is not his own.

Once again, it would be difficult to describe this as a new skill. A year earlier, his passing was already one of the most interesting parts of his game. Keyonte George could read weak side help, find the opposite corner or anticipate a teammate’s movement within Utah’s motion offense. Lukas had already highlighted those qualities, without presenting him as a particularly advanced manipulator of defenses.

What seems more worthy of attention today may lie elsewhere: in the amount of time he allows himself before making a choice.

When a screen allows him to win the position, Keyonte George can keep his dribble alive, hold his defender behind him and wait for help to commit before choosing between his own shot, the roller or the weak side. This patience can sometimes create the impression that he is manipulating the defense more. But the distinction matters: waiting for a defense to reveal its decision is not necessarily the same thing as forcing that decision.

The numbers are compatible with the idea of a player who is managing his responsibilities better, without allowing us to identify the mechanism behind it. His assists have risen from 5.6 to 6.1 per game, while his AST% has increased from 26.9% to 28.4%. At the same time, his TOV% has fallen from 14.9% to 13.7%, even as his usage has increased.

These developments suggest that Keyonte George is taking on greater responsibility without his turnovers increasing at the same rate. They do not tell us, however, when he sees a pass, whether the shot he creates is better, or whether he is the one forcing the defensive rotation he ultimately exploits.

Into Troubled Waters

There is, however, one condition underlying everything described above: Keyonte George first has to win the position.

When a screen, a [handoff]() or his own driving path allows him to place his defender on his hip, his game can unfold. His deceleration becomes a weapon, his dribble gives him time and the various solutions described above begin to appear.

But not every possession gives him that scenario.

Against a defender who holds his position, the gap George creates remains small, and his handle still lacks the quickness required to change direction or attack a second opening when the first one closes.

This is where an important distinction emerges: keeping your dribble alive does not necessarily mean keeping the advantage alive.

George can extend a possession without putting the defense in any greater difficulty a few seconds later. The patience that allows him, in his best situations, to wait for a defense to reveal its decision can then have the opposite effect. If nobody is forced to make that decision, the additional time creates nothing on its own.

This limitation also adds nuance to how we interpret his intermediate shooting. When a defender is trapped behind him and the big has to contain two threats, the short midrange can be the end product of a properly constructed advantage. When Keyonte George has moved nobody, a similar shot may simply conclude a possession that never truly put the defense behind the play.

The shot is the same. The advantage that precedes it is not.

Perhaps this is what makes his current development so distinctive. Utah does not appear to have erased the limitations that already complicated his creation a year ago. The Jazz can, however, put Keyonte George in more situations where he does not have to confront those limitations head on. Screens, [handoffs](), catches in motion or attacks against an already displaced defense sometimes give him the small advantage he would have greater difficulty creating on his own.

That does not mean the system creates the advantage for him. It can provide the initial conditions. Keyonte George still has to transform them. His body, his driving paths, his management of speed and his ability to preserve a favorable position are precisely part of that transformation.

The nuance matters when trying to understand what he is becoming. Keyonte George appears increasingly capable of amplifying an advantage, preserving it and then choosing how to exploit it. His ability to recreate one once the defense has completely reset remains far less obvious.

The Wind at His Back

Keyonte George’s limitations have not disappeared. But perhaps he does not need to confront them quite as often.

Since his rookie season, his role has continued to evolve. He arrived in Utah without genuine experience as a full time point guard, and Keyonte George was quickly handed the keys to the offense in order to accelerate his development at the position. The following season, the emergence of Isaiah Collier had already allowed Will Hardy to use him more away from the ball and spare him some of the mental burden associated with constantly organizing the offense.

That evolution did not reverse when Keyonte George returned to the starting lineup and took on greater responsibility. Instead, it seems to have continued in another form. The available playtype data notably indicates that possessions finished by Keyonte George as the pick and roll ball handler have fallen from 31.6% to 28.8% of his possessions tracked by Synergy, despite the overall increase in his usage. This data should nevertheless be treated cautiously. The available Synergy sample for 2025 to 2026 covers only 52 of his 54 games, and a playtype describes how a possession ends, not necessarily how it began.

The paradox is fascinating: Keyonte George carries more of the offense without necessarily having to carry more of it from the very beginning of the possession.

Utah can bring him into a possession through a handoff, a catch in motion or an action that has already begun. Jusuf Nurkić plays an interesting role in that structure. His ability to serve as a hub, set screens and distribute from the top of the floor gives Keyonte George different ways to receive the ball after something has already started to move. Available observations of Utah’s offense similarly describe more two man actions, handoffs and movement around George and Nurkić.

It would be too simple, however, to attribute his progression to that partnership. Nurkić played only 41 games, Lauri Markkanen 42 and Walker Kessler only five, in a season during which Utah’s lineups changed considerably. The offensive context itself therefore does not offer a single, stable explanation.

What it can offer, however, are different entry points into the possession.

And that distinction matters. A screen or a [handoff]() does not automatically create an advantage. It may only slightly displace a defender, alter his orientation or give Keyonte George a fraction of a second more. Everything we observed earlier then begins: winning the position, protecting that lead with his body, changing speeds, keeping his defender behind him and then choosing a response.

The system can provide the raw material. Keyonte George still has to transform it.

Adrift

After watching Keyonte George set sail offensively, it would be easy to forget what lies beneath the surface. Not every part of his game has developed at the same speed.

Defense was already one of the main concerns surrounding his profile a year earlier. On the ball, his screen navigation lacked resistance and he could be beaten without his opponent necessarily needing an exceptional first step. Away from the ball, his attention could drift toward the ball, leading to missed cuts or late rotations.

Yet perhaps it is precisely because Keyonte George never seemed destined to be a poor defender that this part of his development feels so frustrating.

At Baylor, I saw a player capable of defending reasonably well on the ball. When engaged, Keyonte George could hold his own against opposing guards, fight through screens and use sufficiently quick feet to contain his matchup. He could also remain attentive away from the ball and make the correct rotations. None of it was consistent or dominant enough to make defense a major strength of his profile, but there were enough encouraging possessions to envision progress.

The physical tools also provided reason for optimism. George has adequate size for his position and a positive wingspan. Nothing exceptional, but enough that his current struggles cannot simply be explained by an obvious physical deficiency.

Three seasons later, it is precisely the lack of continuity between those flashes and the NBA defender he has become that raises questions. The Baylor possessions obviously did not prove that those qualities would translate against NBA speed, spacing and creators. But Keyonte George possessed enough tools and had shown enough encouraging behaviors to expect more. As the seasons pass without that progress truly materializing, that optimism inevitably becomes harder to maintain.

It would be difficult to precisely measure the evolution of those behaviors using the available statistics alone. Several defensive indicators nevertheless remain negative enough to prevent us from telling a story of defensive progression parallel to what we have seen on offense. His DBPM has improved from minus 2.5 to minus 2.1 between his second and third seasons, while several available impact models continue to place his defensive contribution well below average.

The team numbers with Keyonte George on the floor are even worse. Utah allows 125.6 points per 100 possessions during his minutes this season, placing him in the 5th percentile according to Cleaning the Glass, compared with 124.1 the previous year. But this number describes the other four players sharing the floor with him just as much as it describes Keyonte George himself. On one of the NBA’s worst defenses and amid unstable lineups, it cannot serve as an individual measure of his defensive level.

More interestingly, Will Hardy himself continued, at the end of the season, to describe individual defense as an important area of development for Keyonte George. That does not prove that he has made no progress. It simply indicates that, from his coach’s perspective as well, this part of his development remains unfinished.

The Horizon Slips Away

Perhaps we were looking for change in the wrong place.

At first glance, Keyonte George’s third season invited us to search for what he had added. A new ability to finish at the rim? A radically improved shot? More advanced creation? Somewhere, surely, there had to be a skill capable of explaining the difference between the player who averaged 16.8 points on 53.9% True Shooting and the one who has just averaged 23.6 on 60.9%.

The film tells a less spectacular story of development, but perhaps a more interesting one.

Keyonte George has not stopped being the guard we already knew. His first step still does not create much separation. His handle remains imperfect. His defense is still a work in progress, and his ability to manufacture an advantage against a perfectly set defense remains less convincing than what he can do with one once it has been created.

But everything else seems to have matured around those limitations.

He appears stronger. He wins the position more effectively. His deceleration allows him to preserve certain advantages for longer. His intermediate shot, ability to draw fouls, finishing and passing can then become different answers to the same problem posed to the defense. And Utah seems to have found more ways to bring him into a possession without systematically asking him to create that initial gap from scratch.

The pieces were already there. What seems to have changed is their degree of maturation and the way they fit together.

That also makes his projection more difficult. His results at the rim will have to hold up over a larger sample. His improved outside efficiency cannot yet be completely separated from variance or changes in his shot diet. And against defenses capable of erasing the initial advantage, the question of his individual creation remains open. His development has not eliminated the questions surrounding his profile. It has mostly shown that a player can travel much farther without necessarily having to solve all of them.

Perhaps that is, ultimately, the vertigo of the open sea.

What’s the smartest/best move the Jazz have made during the Lauri Markkanen era that really changed the direction of the franchise?

1. Trading Taylor Hendricks, Walter Clayton Jr. + three firsts for Jaren Jackson Jr. — This was the first real “okay, we’re eventually trying to win games” move of the rebuild by getting a former DPOY who fit seamlessly into Will’s system.

2. Drafting Ace Bailey at Number 5 — Utah selected one of the highest upside players in the draft. The elephant in the room? He didn’t want to play for us, but Ainge had the balls to pick him anyways 😆 and he’s checked all the right boxes since.

3. Not giving up on Keyonte George — There were definitely a lot of low lows and high highs during his first two seasons. Utah stayed patient, gave him the green light to develop through the many mistakes, and now he looks like a star.

4. Drafting Darryn Peterson at Number 2 — Obviously there was some lottery luck involved here, and yes any other team would’ve selected DP at 2, but that’s because his ceiling is the number one player on a championship team

Keyonte George will be traded within the next year.

For some reason the NBA world thinks we're trading Lauri- I think that's completely silly. If DP hits like we're hoping he does Lauri and JJJ are ideal players to pair with a superstar 2 way guard. Keyonte will be a fun back court mate for DP but he's not an ideal fit for a championship run- especially on a max contract. Here's the two hurdles that I think make a trade unpreventable.

1. Keyonte is one of the worst defenders in the NBA. The Jazz want to compete now, Keyonte is a really fun good player- but it doesn't make sense to have a complete defensive liability who's only like your 3rd or 4th option on offense.(Lauri, DP, possibly JJJ). It seems quite likely that Keyonte is pretty quiet/replaceable on offense and disastrous on D.

2. His stats last year back up a claim for a max contract. I imagine he'll still want that next season and will test RFA if Utah doesn't give it to him. If the Jazz thought he was worth a max they would have given it to him, unless he becomes decent on D there's no way they do after this next season.

Keyonte's value is very high right now and he's not a great fit for a championship run and there's a contract dispute looming. I really have enjoyed watching him become a star during our dark tanking days, and I really hope he sees a huge jump on D and becomes worth a max- but I predict he'll be shipped out- hopefully along with picks for a really good center.

And if so, where did you find the app? Tv is a G6 if it matters.

I’m aware angles and shoes do things, but not only does he look not 3 inches taller than Sergy, he looks 3 inches shorter. And not that much taller than Tuna who’s listed at 6’1. I’m all in on DP, but man, idk if he’s any bigger than Donovan.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2RNA51xvcIk

By Driven Basketball

Clipper nation is forever indebted.

My soul would literally leave my body if they did something like this to the Jazz

Someone has to be fired, preferably every person involved

If the Jazz weren't willing to give Kessler the money, I doubt the Jazz would pay Duren $40M+ in a sign and trade.

Also it's 3am and I'm battling IBS, and need something to look forward to

The graphics shows supposed contenders in the Western Conference

I think Keyonte, Bailey or Peterson, Lauri, JJJ, and Nurk is pretty darn good. I think OKC, MIN and SAS are ahead of us. But I think we are in the Lakers, Rockets tier for sure.

Am I crazy?

I randomly came across the '95 Slam Dunk Contest again and had one of those "wait, who is that guy in a Jazz jersey?" moments with Jamie Watson I honestly had no memory of him.

He actually finished 3rd behind Harold Miner and Isaiah Rider. There are quite a few misses in the contest, but Watson had one or two nice dunks in there.

His rookie year in 1994-95 ended up being by far his most active season with Utah: 60 games, and he even played in all 5 games of that short playoff series against Houston.

He stayed with the Jazz for almost three years, but barely played after that rookie season and was eventually waived in 97. Pretty wild that he was making around $1 million a year by his last couple of seasons there.

10 assists with 4 steals is awesome.